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I. INTRODUCTION
We learn from the time we are children that if we hurt someone, even by
accident, the right thing to do is apologize and see if we can help to make
things better.1 Apologizing and taking responsibility for our actions is built
into the psyche of American culture However, there is one player in this
culture, the physician who cares for us when we are sick or injured, who
has historically refused to admit any mistake that he or she may make. The
physician is guided by none other than Hippocrates himself, who taught that
a physician should conceal "most things from the patient while... attend-
ing to him . . . revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condi-
tion."3 This "medical paternalism" continued to dominate the profession
well into the twentieth century, guided by the American Medical Associa-
tion's Code of Ethics directing all physicians "to avoid all things which
have a tendency to discourage the patient and to depress his spirits."4
It was not until 1957 when an American court first used the phrase "in-
formed consent" to describe the duty of disclosure that a treating physician
owes to his patient when deciding treatment options. It took the American
Medical Association (AMA) another twenty-four years to amend its code to
encourage a more honest and open communication between physician and
patient, at least in the initial stages, when deciding on a course of treat-
ment.6 In 1981 the AMA finally acknowledged that, when deciding on a
treatment option, "[i]nformed consent is a basic policy in both ethics and
law that physicians must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or other-
wise incapable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is imminent."11
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Apologies As Intellectual Property Remedies: Lessons from China, 44 CONN.
L. REv. 883, 888 (2012) (noting that children learn from their parents at a "young age to say the ubiqui-
tous phrase when they take away toys from a friend without permission, hit a playmate, or hurt a friend's
feelings."); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First
Century, 18 O-1O ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 829, 837-38 (2003) (observing that "children learn what con-
stitutes an appropriate form of apology, its effects, and when one should expect to give or receive an
apology").
2 See Nguyen, supra note 1, at 888-89 (noting the apologies of politicians, athletes, and the United
States Congress for 246 years of institutional slavery and subsequent Jim Crow laws).
' Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is Right" to "Patient Has Rights," 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2000) (quoting 2 HIPPOCRATES, DECORUM 297 (W. Jones trans., Cam-
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1967)).
4 Id. at 1244 (citation omitted).
5 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
6 See AM. MED. ASSN, CODE OF MED. ETInCS, OPINION 8.08-INFORMED CONSENT (1981) [hereinafter
AMA OPINION 8.08], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics
/code-medical-ethics/opinion808.page (acknowledging that a "patient's right of self-decision can be ef-
fectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an informed choice.").7 Id.
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Almost twenty years later came the push for transparency after treat-
ment-after, in some cases, mistakes are made and a patient suffers harm.8
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued its report in 1999 that publicized
the shockingly high number of deaths resulting every year because of mis-
takes made by physicians. 9 In its report, the IOM called for a study of these
mistakes to find ways to prevent them and the only way to accomplish that
was to report them to someone.1 0 Of course, it would make sense for the
physciains to report the mistakes to the victims themselves, and the AMA
had already acknowledged, in the 1981 amendments to its Code of Medical
Ethics, that "[s]ituations occasionally occur in which a patient suffers sig-
nificant medical complications that may have resulted from the physician's
mistake or judgment" and that "[i]n these situations, the physician is ethi-
cally required to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure un-
derstanding of what has occurred." 1
Despite this push for transparency, however, change came slowly. Over
the next few decades, the federal and state governments established report-
ing systems to track mistakes and corrections made, but few of these report-
ing requirements ensured that the patients who suffered harm were in-
formed of the mistakes made. 12 The reasons for this are many, including
physicians' fears that honesty would lead to a loss of respect by their peers,
lawsuits by their victims, and the loss of insurance coverage.13
Acknowledging the reality of these fears, state legislatures and courts
have tried to encourage physicians to admit their mistakes by making apol-
ogies and even admissions of fault inadmissible in medical malpractice
lawsuits.14 This paper examines these attempts, generically referred to "I'm
' COMM. ON QUALITY & HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., Nat'l Acad. Press 2000) [hereinafter To ERR IS HUMAN],
available at https://www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%2OErr%20
is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf
9 Id. (noting that "[a]t least 44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals each
year as a result of medical errors that could have been prevented").
1d. at 3.
AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MED. ETECS, OPINION 8.12-PATENT INFORMATION (1981) [hereinafter
AMA OPINION 8.12], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethic
s/code-medical-ethics/opinion8l2.
12 See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
'" Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The University of
Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE ScI. L. 125, 128 (2009) (noting that physicians' reluctance to
speak to their patients about mistakes and complications unrelated to mistakes because of "myriad fears"
including "a natural aversion to confronting angry people; concerns that disclosure might invite a claim
that otherwise would not be asserted; anxiety that the discussion will compromise courtroom defenses
later; and fear that the conversation may lead to loss of malpractice insurance or higher premiums.").
'4 See infra note 43 for a list of those statutes.
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sorry" laws or "apology" statutes, in light of the concerns raised if physi-
cians are honest. After a review of a physician's ethical duty to disclose
and the empirical evidence of how open and honest communication be-
tween patient and physician actually benefits both the patient and the treat-
ing physician, the paper questions whether apologies by health care provid-
ers need the protection afforded by these laws.
Section II reviews the history of the medical profession's tendency to-
ward silence and the reasons for that silence. Section III examines the state
statutes passed to encourage the breaking of this silence. Section IV re-
views the state rules of evidence that have traditionally been applied to de-
termine whether or not statements of regret or fault are admissible and ex-
amines how these statements affect the outcome of medical malpractice
claims. Then, Section V considers a physician's ethical duty of full disclo-
sure and the impact of honest communication between physician and pa-
tient. Section VI concludes, based on these considerations, that a physician
should disclose mistakes and admit responsibility for those mistakes, and
should do so without any special protection if they are sued to answer for
those mistakes. Requiring physicians to do the same as what we expect of
our children best serves a patient's interests and properly reflects a physi-
cian's ethical duty to disclose.
II. SILENCE, PLEASE
Physicians have traditionally kept their mistakes to themselves. 15 With
perfection as their goal, physicians have operated under the assumption that
"mistakes are unacceptable" and, if they are made, they should not be ad-
mitted.16 However, assuming mistakes are unacceptable does not mean that
physicians do not make them, as the IOM emphatically proved in 1999.17
In To Err is Human, the IOM reported that between 44,000 and 98,000
Americans die in hospitals each year due to medical mistakes.1 8 That num-
's Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I'm Sorry: Lawyers, Doctors and
Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1410, 1428 (2009) (noting that "doctors and other health
care professionals traditionally practiced in the context of a culture of silence"); Marlynn Wei, Doctors,
Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 40 J. HEALTH L. 107, 109 (2007)
(noting the "pressing problem in medicine" of not only "the lack of apologies, but a more fundamental
lack of disclosure").
" Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1417 (citation omitted).
'7 See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 8, at 1.
11 To ERR is HUMAN, supra note 8, at 1; see also Steven E. Raper, No Role for Apology: Remedial Work
and the Problem of Medical Injury, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 267, 276 (2011) (noting
that "error is an inherent, unavoidable aspect of human work.").
4
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 18 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol18/iss3/6
A PHYSICIAN'S APOLOGY
ber does not even reflect the actual numbers of people injured who did not
actually die or were treated in health care facilities other than hospitals.' 9
Even after the publication of this report, physicians tended not to admit
mistakes to anyone.2 They did not admit mistakes to other physicians who,
they feared, would think less of them. 21 Nor did they admit mistakes to their
patients, perhaps for the same reasons, or perhaps because they feared their
patients would sue them and use their admissions against them in court.
Indeed, fearing liability, hospital administrators, insurance carriers, and de-
fense lawyers routinely instruct physicians that they should not disclose
mistakes to their patients.23 As noted by one defense counsel, "Why give
the enemy even one tiny gram of TNT if I could give them none?"'24
This fear is not without foundation. For example, in one case against
Georgetown University, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, allowed a physician's admission that he had performed the "wrong
operation" and that he had "forgotten" that the surgery he performed was
not appropriate given the patient's condition to establish a prima facie case
of negligence against him. 25 In other cases, courts have held that an admis-
sion may not, by itself, prove negligence, but it may be admitted as evi-
dence of it.26
In a Utah case, decided before the state had enacted its apology law, the
Court of Appeals considered a request to keep an admission of fault out of
court. 2' The physician requesting that protection had recommended that a
patient have joint replacement surgery on a toe without trying more con-
servative treatments or referring the patient to a rheumatologist. 28 The sur-
gery did not work and, after several subsequent surgeries, the patient be-
'9 To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 8, at 2.
20 To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 8, at 2; see also Pavlick, supra note 1, at 852.
21 TO ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 8, at 2; see also Pavlick, supra note 1, at 852.
22See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 128; Jeffrey S. Helnreich, Does 'Sorry' Incriminate? Evidence,
Harm and the Protection of Apology, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 567, 573 (2012) (citation omitted)
(noting a survey of physicians who expressed the desire to apologize to their patients for harming them
but the decision not to for fear that the apology would be used against them in court).
23 Helnreich, supra note 22, at 573 (citation omitted).
24 Helnreich, supra note 22, at 573 n.33 (citation omitted).
25 Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 623 A.2d 1244, 1253 (D.C. 1993), rev'd en banc, 641 A.2d 469 (D.C.
1994); see Raper, supra note 18, at 297-02 (reviewing several cases in which a physician's admissions
were admitted and used to establish a prima facie case of negligence against him).
26 See, e.g., Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 850 (Vt. 1992) (holding that, while the defendant's ad-
mission of mistake may have been admissible, it did not "by itself' establish a prima facie case); Woods
v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (acknowledging that statements of fault may be ad-
missible but would not alone be sufficient to prove negligence).
27 Woods, 158 P.3d at 552.
28 Id. at 553-54.
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came permanently disabled. 9 After the surgery, the physician admitted to
the patient that "'I jumped the gun,' 'I've missed something,' and 'I don't
think we should have done this surgery.""'
The trial court decided the physician's statements were inadmissible pur-
suant to the state's rules of evidence "on the grounds that the testimony is
minimally probative and is substantially outweighed by the dangers of un-
fair prejudice."3 1 Consistent with the federal rules and other analogous state
rules, the Utah appellate court noted that "relevant evidence is generally
admissible."32 Under the broad definition of relevance, defined as "evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence,"3 3 the trial court determined that the
statements by the physician that he "missed something," '"umped the gun,"
and "shouldn't have done this surgery" were relevant to the question of his
negligence.3 4 The trial court excluded the evidence despite its relevance,
however, because its probative value was "substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.""
On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision to exclude the
statements on the ground that, while the statements may be prejudicial, they
were not "unfairly prejudicial. 36 The importance of this decision lies in the
fact that the appellate court allowed the physician's statements to be con-
sidered by the jury, but it did not mean that the victim necessarily would
win his case. The court noted only that the plaintiff s testimony regarding
the physician's alleged statements is "highly probative because it reveals a
medical expert's assessment of his own actions, an assessment that has bear-
ing on the determination of negligence-specifically, on the question of
breach of the standard of care." 38 Balancing the probative value of the evi-
dence with its potential prejudicial effect, the court noted that "the state-
ments do not contain information that would likely create feelings of "bias,
sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror" in the fact finder, or in-
29 Id. at 554.
3 id.
31 Id. (quoting the trial court's decision to exclude the statements).
32 Woods, 158 P.3d at 554 (citation onitted).
33 Id. (quoting UTAH R. EviD. 401(2011)).
34 Id.
35 Id. (quoting UTAH R. EviD. 403 (2011)).
36 Id.
31 See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of this evidence on the
Woods case.
38 Woods, 158 P.3d at 555.
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formation that would otherwise shift the fact finder's attention away from
the proper method for resolving the negligence issue.."" Seeing "only a
remote possibility that the evidence at issue is of the sort that will lead the
fact finder to render a decision on an emotional or otherwise improper ba-
sis," the court therefore held that the evidence could come in.40
After the Woods case was decided, the Utah legislature stepped in to
guarantee that statements like the ones made in that case would not be ad-
missible, regardless of the probative value or the prejudicial effect those
statements might have in a future case.4 1 Pursuant to the Utah statute, "any
unswom statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct made to the patient" by
the defendant in a malpractice action against a health care provider "as evi-
dence of an admission against interest or of liability if it expresses (i) apol-
ogy, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or (ii) a general
sense of benevolence; or (b) describes (i) the sequence of events relating to
the unanticipated outcome of medical care; (ii) the significance of events; or
(iii) both." is "inadmissible as evidence of an admission against interest or
of liability. 42 A majority of states have similar laws, which are reviewed in
the following section.
III. THE "APOLOGY" LAWS
Two-thirds of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted stat-
utes that define apologies of one sort or another as inadmissible in medical
malpractice lawsuits to prove that the apologizing physician negligently
provided medical care.43 The first of these laws was passed in Massachu-
" Id. (citation omitted).
40 Id.
41 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (West 2008).
42 Id. Only one court has considered the reach of this statute. See Lawrence v. Mountainstar Healthcare,
320 P.3d 1037, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 329 P.3d 36 (Utah 2014) (deciding that admis-
sions of fault are admissible in light of the statute's failure to explicitly protect them). See infra section
III for a discussion of this case and others addressing the scope of apology laws.
41 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (West 2014);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184d (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (West 2015); D.C.
CODE § 16-2841 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026 (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (West
2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (West 2014); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1901 (West 2014);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.51-4 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.31 (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., Courts and
Judicial Proceedings § 10-920 (LexisNexis 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 79L (West 2014);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2155 (West 2014); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.229 (West 2014); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-1201 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-E:4 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-04-12 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.43 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
677.082 (West 2014); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10228.3 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190
20151
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setts in 198644 in response to the traffic death of the daughter of a former
state senator.4 Wanting an apology from the driver but never getting one,
the former senator discovered that the driver had wanted to apologize but
was afraid that it would be used against him if he were sued.46 Based on
this revelation, the former senator prodded the Massachusetts legislature to
enact a statute to protect apologies made by any tortfeasor by making them
inadmissible in any civil action.4
Since Massachusetts passed its law, a majority of states and the District
of Columbia have enacted a "patchwork" of laws.48 Although they are ge-
nerically referred to as "apology" laws, the term "apology" is difficult to
define.49 In a recent decision considering the scope of Utah's apology law,
the Court of Appeals in that state observed that an apology may or may not
include an admission of fault and defies any dictionary definition. 0 It may
be as simple as saying "I am sorry" or as complex as including an "admis-
sion of responsibility, expression of remorse, promise of forbearance, and
offer to repair. 51
Trying to avoid any confusion about what is protected and what is not,
most of the statutes differentiate between expressions of apology or regret
and admissions of fault or liability, with some statutes explicitly protecting
both, 52 but most protecting only statements of apology and explicitly ex-
(1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2014); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West
2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (West 2014); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (West Supp. 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.64.010 (West 2015); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-11 a (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (West 2014); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1160 (2014); UTAH R. EvID. 409 (2014); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1 (2014). Georgia could be in-
cluded in the tally as another state that enacted a protective statute but its statute was repealed. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (West 2014) (repealed 2013).
44 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West 1986).
4' Helnreich, supra note 22, at 575.
46 Helnreich, supra note 22, at 575 (citing Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apol-
ogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1151 (2000)).
47§ 23D.
48 Raper, supra note 18, at 308; see also Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 132 (noting that the "statutes
range from broad and far-reaching to narrow.").
41 See Lawrence v. Mountainstar Healthcare, 320 P.3d 1037, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied,
329 P.3d 36 (Utah 2014) (noting that trying to define "apology" is "one of those cases where the dic-
tionary fails to dictate the meaning that the statutory term must bear in this context.") (citations omitted).50 d.
5' Helnreich, supra note 22, at 579 (citing Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the
Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J.
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 127, 132 (1997)); see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72. S.
CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1022 (1999).
52 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (2005) (West); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-184d (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.64.010 (2006).
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cluding statements of fault. 3 Several state laws, however, fail to address
whether admissions of fault are protected or not.54 While some health care
providers may take solace in the protections their state legislators have giv-
en them, many still hesitate to discuss mistakes openly with their patients
because it remains unclear exactly what will be protected and what will not,
even in jurisdictions that explicitly address admissions of fault. 55
Adding to the confusion is that the laws also differ by protecting differ-
ent apologizers. Eight states' laws, like Massachusetts' pioneering law,
protect apologies made by any tortfeasor, making apologies by any alleged
wrongdoer inadmissible in any civil action as proof of negligence. 6 Iowa's
statute, by contrast, protects apologies made by an enumerated list of pro-
51 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (2006); D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. §
34-43.5-1-4 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
2907 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (West 2004); MICH. COMp. LAWS §
600.2155 (2011); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2007); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (2005); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10228.3 (2013); Tx. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (2007); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160
(Deering 2000); TENN. R. EVID. 409.1 (2003).
54 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79L (2012) (making inadmissible "all statements, affirmations,
gestures, activities or conduct expressing benevolence, regret, apology, sympathy, commiseration, con-
dolence, compassion, mistake, error or a general sense of concern"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814
(West 2005) (protecting any "statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct expressing apology, sympathy,
commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffer-
ing, or death of a person"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-12 (2007) (protecting any statement of "apology,
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or benevolence"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43
(West 2004) (protection "all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, sympa-
thy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 1- 1708.1H (West 2004) (protecting "all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apol-
ogy, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence"); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 677.082 (West 2003) (protecting "any expression of regret or apology"); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-1-190 (2006) (protecting "conduct, statements, or activity constituting voluntary offers of assis-
tance or expressions of benevolence, regret, mistake, error, sympathy, or apology"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-12-14 (2005) (protecting statements of apology "for an adverse outcome in medical treat-
ment," offers "to undertake corrective or remedial treatment or action," and "gratuitous act[s] to assist
affected persons"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (LexisNexis 2008) (protecting statements of "apolo-
gy, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion" or "a general sense of benevolence); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2005) (protecting statements of "regret or apology"); W. VA .CODE ANN. §
55-7-1 a (LexisNexis 2008) (protecting statements of "apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence,
compassion or a general sense of benevolence"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2004) (protecting state-
ments of "apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a general sense of benevo-
lence").
55 Accord Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); see Raper, supra note 18, at 297-302
(noting the requirement for a "particularized fact assessment that is difficult to reconcile with any given
state statute"); see also Davis v. Wooster Orthopaedics & Sports Med., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1216, 1221
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (deciding that Ohio's statute that does not address admissions of fault does not
protect them).
56 FLA. STAT. § 90.4026 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (2007); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (2006);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229.1 (2005);; TX. CfV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160; TENN. R. EVID. 409.1.
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fessionals, including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, chiropractors, engi-
neers, accountants, architects, landscape architects, and barbers, as well as
"any other licensed profession recognized" in the state. The rest of the
state laws protect the apologies, expressions of sorrow or condolence and,
in some cases as noted above, admissions of fault, of only health care pro-
viders and their employees or agents. 58 It is noteworthy that Massachusetts,
in 2012, passed a law that applies only to health care providers, even though
it already had on its books a law protecting any tortfeasor facing a negli-
gence claim.59
The reason offered for all of these laws, whether they protect only physi-
cians or all tortfeasors, is to alleviate the fear that an apology will be used to
establish liability in an eventual lawsuit.60 Without explaining why their
laws do not protect all tortfeasors, the states with statutes that protect health
care providers and their employees and agents make clear that the intention
of these laws is to provide "opportunities for healthcare providers to apolo-
gize and console victims of unanticipated outcomes of medical care without
fear that their statements will be used against them in a malpractice suit, by
making the statements inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability
or a statement against interest. "61
Hawaii's statute protects all tortfeasors, but the legislature initially con-
sidered limiting the protection of its apology law to health care providers, as
other states have done, and the state's Supreme Court explained the legisla-
ture's reasoning.62 In State v. Lealao, a criminal case, the defendant was
" IOWA CODE § 622.31.
5 See, e.g., O-Io REV. CODE ANN. §2317.43 (limiting protection in only civil actions "brought by an
alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical care"); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10228.3 (protecting
statements of apology by a health care provider or an officer, employee or agent of a health care provid-
er).
" Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79L (2012) (protecting apologies by health care providers),
with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (protecting apologies by all tortfeasors).
60 See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 820 (2002)
(noting that the apology laws respond to the concern that "apologies are often not offered after injuries,
in part from the fear of liability"); Helmreich, supra note 22, at 575 (noting that the laws are intended to
encourage apologies by explicitly denying their admissibility as evidence).
61 Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., 989 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ohio 2013); see also UTAH R. EVID.
409(b) (2011) (legislative note) (explaining that the "intent and purpose of amending the rule with para-
graph (b) is to encourage expressions of apology, empathy, and condolence and the disclosure of facts
and circumstances related to unanticipated outcomes in the provision of health care in an effort to facili-
tate the timely and satisfactory resolution of patient concerns arising from unanticipated outcomes in the
provision of health care. Patient records are not statements made to patients, and therefore are not inad-
missible under this rule."); Raper, supra note 18, at 302 (noting that "apology laws are supposed to en-
courage doctors to speak up when medical errors occur--to push doctors to engage in apologies as part
of disclosure.").
62 See State v. Lealao, 272 P.3d 1227, 1228 (Haw. 2012) (holding that the state's apology statute applies
to all civil cases, but not to criminal cases).
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convicted of assault and challenged the admissibility of his apology to his
victim as evidence of liability for the crime. 63  Deciding that the apology
statute applied only to civil cases, the Supreme Court considered the
breadth of the statute's protection and noted that the state legislature had
questioned limiting it only to health care providers. 64 As explained by the
court, the "original purpose of the measure proposed to the legislature was
'to make benevolent gestures inadmissible as evidence of an admission of
liability in medical malpractice claims."' 65 Upon reflection, however, the
legislature "found it appropriate to allow individuals and entities to express
sympathy and condolence without the expression being used against the in-
dividual or entity to establish civil liability, even if the individual or entity
is not a health care provider., 66 Accordingly, the legislators revised bill to
protect apologies in all civil actions.6
While most states continue to protect only statements of health care pro-
viders, all states have rules of evidence that treat all litigants alike, and they
have been applied in medical malpractice cases. 68 These rules and exam-
ples of how they are applied are reviewed in the following section.
IV. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE IMPACT OF ADMITTING APOLOGIES
INTO EVIDENCE
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible in all civil actions. 69 Relevant
evidence will be inadmissible, however, "if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair preju-
dice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.""° The basic hearsay rule es-
tablishes that out of court statements are not admissible "in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.""1 Statements of party-opponents,
63 Id. at 1229.
64 Id. at 1235.
65 Id. (citation omitted).
66 Id.
67 Lealao, 272 P.3d at 1235.
68 See, e.g., Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (balancing the apology's proba-
tive value with its potential prejudicial effect under the state's rules of evidence).
69 FED. R. EviD. 402. State rules of evidence are analogous to the federal rules and will be separately
addressed in this section only where there are substantive differences between them. See, e.g., Bonser v.
Shainholtz, 983 P.2d 162, 166 (Colo. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 3 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2000) (not-
ing that the state's rule 409 "was adopted verbatim from the Federal Rules of Evidence").
7 0 FED. R. EVID. 403.
7' See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement that "(1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" in the statement.").
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however, are defined by the rules as "not hearsay" and, therefore, admissi-
ble as an exception to the hearsay rule.2 Without specific protection, there-
fore, statements of sorrow, regret, or condolence are admissible under this
exception.
Although admissible, statements of apology or condolence, or even fault,
may nevertheless be kept from the jury if their probative value is out-
weighed by their prejudicial effect.7 ' As addressed above in Section II, the
Utah Court of Appeals considered the argument that statements admitting
fault should be excluded based on the rules of evidence alone, and the trial
court and the appellate court balanced the relevance of the evidence against
the potential prejudicial effect. 7' The trial and appellate courts agreed that
statements by the physician that he "missed something," 'lumped the gun,"
and shouldn't "have done this surgery" were relevant to the question of the
physician's negligence, but disagreed about how that relevance weighed
against the potential prejudicial effect. 6
The appellate court, agreeing with the trial court that the statements
might be prejudicial, decided that the statements were "not unfair-
ly prejudicial," and, therefore, held that the statements should have been
admitted. It should be noted that the admission of this evidence did not
lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff should win.7 ' Rather, the court
acknowledged the defendants' argument that the statements, alone, may not
be sufficient to prove negligence, but emphasized that allowing the evi-
dence will allow the jury to do its job to consider all of the evidence on re-
mand, because, as the court observed, the physician's statement were proba-
tive and, "if believed, would be central to Plaintiffs' case."'79 Emphasizing
the importance of allowing the jury to do its job, the court also noted the de-
fendants' argument that the physician denied ever making the statements
but described this factual dispute over whether he said them or not as a call
"for a routine credibility determination, which is completely within the
province of the jury."8
72 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
71 See Cohen, supra note 60, at 824-25 (noting that "even though an apology would fit the classical def-
inition of hearsay as 'an out of court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted', the Federal Rules treat it as non-hearsay." (footnote omitted)).
71 See Woods v. Zeluff, 158 P.3d 552 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
75 Id. at 554.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 556.
71 Woods, 158 P.3d at 555-56.8 Id. at 555 n.3.
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Other rules of evidence also shield evidence of regret or offers to assist
or pay money, even without the special protection offered by the apology
laws. Federal Rule of Evidence 407, for example, defines as inadmissible
evidence of subsequent remedial steps the tortfeasor may have taken after
the tort occurred.81 Offers of settlement or compromise in a tort claim are
inadmissible under Rule 408,82 and Rule 409 protects "[e]vidence of fur-
nishing, promising to pay, or offering to pay medical, hospital, or similar
expenses resulting from an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the
injury. ' 83
In Bonser v. Shainholtz, the Colorado Appellate Court relied on Rule 409
in holding that the trial court erred when it allowed evidence of a dentist's
statements that he was sorry for injuring the plaintiff, that he "would do
what he could," and "would make things right. '84 The application of these
rules is justified by the need to "encourag[e] people to take, or at least not
discourag[e] them," from taking the actions defined by those rules. 85 As
the court noted regarding Rule 409: "It is the product of a desire to encour-
age humanitarianism. This goal would be undercut if an offer to pay medi-
cal expenses were penalized by allowing it as evidence against the payor. In
addition, the inference that the conduct means anything other than humani-
tarianism is unreliable."8 6
The Supreme Court of Maine recently considered the effect of the state's
rules of evidence and its apology law, which explicitly removed admissions
of fault from protection, on a physician's statements of apology and fault. 87
In that case, a physician, without waiting for the pathology results, in-
formed a patient that he was "likely" suffering from an inoperable and
deadly cancer when, in fact, he was suffering from a lymphoma that was
treatable and had a very high rate of survival. 88 After conducting an inves-
tigation, the hospital wrote the patient a letter explaining what had hap-
pened, reassuring the patient that the treating physician "in no way wanted
1 FED R. EvID. 407. State rules of evidence are analogous and need not be separately addressed. See,
e.g., Bonser v. Shainholtz, 983 P.2d 162, 166 (Colo. App. 1999), rev 'd on other grounds, 3 P.3d 422
(Colo. 2000) (noting that the state's rule 409 "was adopted verbatim from the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence").
8 2 FED R. EVID. 408.
8 3 FED R. EVID. 409.
84 Bonser, 983 P.2d at 166
85 FED. R. EVID. 407 (advisory committee's note); accord FED. R. EvID. 409 (advisory committee's note)
(admitting offers to pay medical expenses "would tend to discourage assistance to the injured person.").
86 Bonser, 983 P.2d at 166.
87See Strout v. Cent. Maine Med. Ctr., 94 A.3d 786 (Me. 2014) (applying ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907
(2005)).
88 Id. at 787-88.
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to harm either you or your wife but wanted you to have a full understanding
of what he thought he would be helping you to deal with."89 The letter also
explained that the physician "realizes now that prior to sharing his clinical
impressions with you, he needed to wait for the results of the biopsy to con-
firm what the cancer was." 90
The defendant argued that the letter was an expression of sympathy or
benevolence and therefore inadmissible under the state's apology law. That
law reads as follows:
In any civil action for professional negligence ... any statement, affirmation,
gesture or conduct expressing apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence,
compassion or a general sense of benevolence that is made by a health care
practitioner or health care provider or an employee of a health care practitioner
or health care provider to the alleged victim, a relative of the alleged victim or a
representative of the alleged victim and that relates to the discomfort, pain, suf-
fering, injury or death of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated
outcome is inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence
of an admission against interest. Nothing in this section prohibits the admissi-
bility of a statement of fault. 91
The defendant also argued that the letter was inadmissible pursuant to the
state's Rule of Evidence 408, making inadmissible offers of compromise, 92
Rule 403, excluding evidence when its probative value is "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," 93 and Rule 409, excluding
evidence of offers to pay medical expenses.94
In response to the defendant's motion in limine, the trial judge admitted
into evidence a redacted version of the letter, which included only the
statement that the physician "realizes now that prior to sharing his clinical
impressions with you, he needed to wait for the results of the biopsy to con-
firm what the cancer was. 95 Based on that letter, as well as testimony on
the facts, the jury determined that the treating physician was negligent and
awarded the plaintiff $200,000.9'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maine addressed the defendant's argu-
ment that "important policy considerations underlie Maine's apology statute
89 Id. at 788.
90 Id.
9' ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907(2) (2005).
92 ME. R. EVlD. 408 (2009).
93 ME. R. EVID. 403.
94 ME. R. EVID. 409. The defendant did not rely on this rle in its appeal of the jury's verdict. Strout, 94
A.3d at 789 n.3.
95 Strout, 94 A.3d at 788-89.
96 Id. at 789.
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and similar statutes in other jurisdictions, and that these policy considera-
tions justify characterizing the statement contained in Covey's letter as a
statement of sympathy or benevolence rather than as an admission of
fault."9  The court disagreed, however, and noted that the statute explicitly
differentiated between expressions of apology or benevolence and state-
ments of fault and that "[n]othing in the language of the statute suggests
that statements of fault are inadmissible if they are accompanied by expres-
sions of apology or benevolence." 8 Relying on the statute's language that
"[n]othing in this section prohibits the admissibility of a statement of fault,"
the court held that the treating physician's statement "that prior to sharing
his clinical impressions with you, he needed to wait for the results of the bi-
opsy to confirm what the cancer was" was an admission of fault that was
admissible, "even when coupled with other statements that may be inadmis-
sible."99 The court then rejected the defendant's arguments that the letter
should have been excluded under the state's evidentiary rules.100
Thus, in a state like Maine whose statute protects expressions of sympa-
thy and apology, but not statements of fault, consideration of the admissibil-
ity of those statements defaults to the state's rules of evidence.01 These
rules have long guided courts in deciding what evidence should come in
and what should be excluded and, as recently observed after a thorough
analysis of the applicable case law, even in cases where statements of apol-
ogy are admitted, they may not alone be sufficient to prove liability.10 2
These statements are also not enough to prove that the errors caused the
harm, where expressions of fault are admissible and liability has been estab-
lished.10 3
Importantly, it should also be noted that even when a physician's apolo-
gies are admitted, plaintiffs may nevertheless lose." In every medical
97 id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 789-90 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2907(2) (2005)).
'0 Id. (rejecting the defendant's argument that the letter was inadmissible as an offer to compromise
under Rule 408(a) because no dispute yet existed about the validity of the claim, and refusing to consid-
er whether the letter was unduly prejudicial on the jury because the defendant failed to provide the court
with a transcript of the trial.)
101 Id.
102 See Helnreich, supra note 22, at 572.
103 See Lawrence v. Mountainstar Healthcare, 320 P.3d 1037, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied,
329 P.3d 36 (Utah 2014) (holding statements that there had been an accident or complication and that
"[w]e messed up" were statements of fault not protected by the state's apology statute but that they were
insufficient to prove that the mistakes caused the plaintiffs harm).
104 See, e.g., Senesac v. Assoc. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 903 (Vt. 1982) (affirming a
directed verdict in favor of a physician defendant who admitted that she made a mistake and that she
was sony for perforating her patient's uterus during the course of a therapeutic abortion).
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malpractice case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
deviated from the accepted standard of care and that that deviation caused
the damages that the plaintiff suffered.10 5 Evidence that the treating physi-
cian apologized, or even admitted fault, may not be enough to carry that
burden.106
For example, in Giles v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc., decided by the
Alabama Supreme Court in a state without an apology statute, the defendant
prevailed on summary judgment. 0 ' In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
the treating physician injured her bowel while improperly removing her
right ovary, instead of the left that had been diagnosed with a cyst. 08 The
plaintiff also alleged that the physician apologized and admitted that he had
taken out the wrong ovary and that he "forgot to look at the charts or his
notes before starting the surgery."' 9 Even taking "every reasonable factual
inference" in favor of plaintiff, as the summary judgment standard required,
the court considered the physician's admissions and apology and decided
that they amounted to "no more than an admission of bona fide mistake of
judgment or untoward result of treatment."1 0 That admission, according to
the court, not only did not prove that the physician was negligent, but it did
not even "provide substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material
fact" as to the allegations of malpractice." '' Accordingly, in light of all of
the evidence presented, the court affirmed the trial court's decision that the
physician was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.11 2
Given a court's power under the rules of evidence to admit or exclude
evidence and the court's and jury's role to weigh evidence that is admitted,
it is fair to ask why health care providers need any additional protection at
all. The answer to this question becomes even more important when
viewed in light of a physician's ethical duty of full disclosure and the posi-
tive effects that full disclosure has on patients and their propensity to sue.
105 See Giles v. Brookwood Health Serv., Inc., 5 So. 3d 533, 548 (Ala. 2008); Phinney v. Vinson, 605
A.2d 849, 849 (Vt. 1992).
116 See, e.g., Sutton v. Calhoun, 593 F.2d 127, 128 (10th Cir. 1979) (deciding that the trial court was
"well within its discretion to conclude that the doctor's statements did not amount to an admission of
negligence. The jury was thus charged to decide what was meant by the doctor's statements in the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident .. "); see also Giles, 5 So. 3d at 552 (doctor's apologies "do not
constitute expert testimony that he injured Giles by breaching the standard of care").
'75 So. 3dat 533.
o Id. at 549.
'o9 Id. at 540-41.
"0 Id. at 552.
. Id. at 553.
112 Giles, 5 So. 3d at 556.
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V. FULL DISCLOSURE IS ETHICALLY REQUIRED AND MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL TO PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS
Like other states, the South Carolina General Assembly justified its
apology law on the basis that "studies have shown such discussions foster
improved communications and respect between provider and patient, pro-
mote quicker recovery by the patient, and reduce the incidence of claims
and lawsuits arising out of such unanticipated outcomes." '113 Based on this
observation, the legislators concluded that "certain steps should be taken to
promote such conduct, statements, or activity by limiting their admissibility
in civil actions." ' The step the legislators took, as the many other states
with apology laws, was to enact the state's apology law, making inadmissi-
ble:
,in any claim or civil action brought by or on behalf of a patient allegedly ex-
periencing an unanticipated outcome of medical care, any and all statements,
affirmations, gestures, activities, or conduct expressing benevolence, regret,
apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, mistake, error, or
a general sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider, an
employee or agent of a health care provider, or by a health care institution to
the patient, a relative of the patient, or a representative of the patient .. 115
What South Carolina and the other states with similar laws have overlooked
is that health care providers are ethically required to explain the details of
their care and that full disclosure actually benefits both patient and physi-
cian. Each of these ideas is addressed separately below.
A. A Physician's Ethical Duty To Disclose
It is by now axiomatic that before treating patients, physicians are re-
quired to obtain their patients' consent. 6 To obtain meaningful consent,
physicians must disclose the risks and benefits of the treatment they rec-
ommend, foregoing treatment, and alternative treatment options. 1 The
reasons for requiring disclosure are based on the notion that it "promotes
". S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (B) (2006).
114Id.
15 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (D).
116 Spencer v. Goodill, 17 A.3d 552, 554-55 (Del. 2011); Quintilla v. Dunkelman, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 557,
572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
1" See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972) (requiring "divulgence by the physician to his patient of
all information relevant to a meaningful decisional process").
20151
17
Zisk: A Physician's Apology: An Argument against Statutory Protection
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2014
386 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVIII:iii
communication and fosters trust" between physicians and they people they
treat."8
It is just as clear that this duty of full disclosure continues throughout the
course of treatment, even if a mistake is made. As explained by the AMA's
Code of Medical Ethics: It is "a fundamental ethical requirement that a
physician should at all times deal honestly and openly with patients."119
Acknowledging that "[s]ituations occasionally occur in which a patient suf-
fers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the phy-
sician's mistake or judgment," the AMA directs in Opinion 8.12 that "the
physician is ethically required to inform the patient of all the facts necessary
to ensure understanding of what has occurred." 12  Thus, to comply with
these ethical requirements, a physician has no choice but to admit to mis-
takes, without regard to how those admissions might be used in a lawsuit,
should one be filed against him or her. Importantly, the AMA considers the
possibility that anything the physician says may have a legal impact and re-
iterates the necessity of honesty and full disclosure: "Concern regarding
legal liability which might result following truthful disclosure should not
affect the physician's honesty with a patient." 121
B. Honesty Benefits Physician and Patient
There is little if any dispute that patient care improves when mistakes are
identified and understood so that efforts can be made to avoid them in the
future. 122 As noted above, in "To Err is Human," the IOM identified the
high rate of patient deaths due to medical mistakes and called on health care
providers to identify their mistakes and learn from them. 123 To ensure the
identification of mistakes, the IOM urged Congress to set up a national re-
porting system under which health-care providers would be required to re-
port serious errors and encouraged to report less serious ones." To ensure
that change would come of this reporting, the IOM recommended that the
..8 Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1405, 1405 (1989); see Nancy L. Zisk, Investing in Health Care: What Happens When Physicians
Invest and Why the Recent Changes in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Fail to Protect
Patients From Their Physicians' Self Interest, 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REv. 189, 192-93 (Fall 2012).
11" AMA OPINION 8.12.
120 AMA OPINION 8.12.
121 Id.
122 See Raper, supra note 18, at 275 ("Accurate reporting of outcomes is crucial to improving patient
safety."); see also Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1417.
123 See To Err is Human, supra note 8, at 1, 3.
124 See To Err is Human, supra note 8, at 3.
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serious mistakes be made available to the public which would impel health
care providers to develop procedures to avoid them in the future. 1 25 To en-
courage the reporting of the mistakes that would ultimately lead to the de-
velopment of procedures to prevent less serious errors as well, the IOM
recommended that the data reported be kept from the public but analyzed to
identify possibilities for improvement. 126
Following the IOM report, and based on its recommendation, the federal
and state governments began requiring health care providers to identify and
report medical errors.121 In 2005, Congress enacted the Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) that created a voluntary system for re-
porting and aggregating patient safety information through "Patient Safety
Organizations.1 12  Responding directly to the IOM's call, the PSQIA was
designed to encourage a "culture of safety" by "providing for broad confi-
dentiality and legal protections of information collected and reported volun-
tarily for the purposes of improving the quality of medical care and patient
safety.1 129  More recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Health
Care Act (PPACA) affirmed the need to report treatment outcomes and
links payment to the quality of care.130
125 See To Err is Human, supra note 8, at 3.
126 See To Err is Human, supra note 8, at 3.
127 See Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1418-20 (reviewing state and federal reporting requirements).
Pennsylvania, for example, required hospitals to report serious events to patients. See 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1303.308(b) (West 2002) (providing that a "medical facility through an appropriate de-
signee shall provide written notification to a patient affected by a serious event or, with the consent of
the patient, to an available family member or designee within seven days of the occurrence or discovery
of a serious event."). A "serious event" is defined by the statute as "[a]n event, occurrence or situation
involving the clinical care of a patient in a medical facility that results in death or compromises patient
safety and results in an unanticipated injury requiring the delivery of additional health care services to
the patient." 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.302 (West 2006); see Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at
1419, n.38. The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act incorporates disclosure requirements
and rewards positive patient outcomes by linking payment to the quality of care. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww (2012).
128 Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2000).
129 S. REP. No. 108-196, at 4 (2003). The PSQIA followed the enactment of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA) that required health care entities to report adverse actions taken against phy-
sicians to a national practitioner data bank. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-
11152 (1982). Unlike the PSQIA, geared directly to improving care and patient safety, the stated goal of
the HCQIA was "to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State without
disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent performance." § 11101. To
encourage physicians to report these problems, Congress assured immunity from damages for persons
participating in peer review if certain standards are satisfied" and made clear that the data received
would be available only to health care entities and not to the public. §§ 11111, 11112, 11137(a).
130 See 42 U.S.C. §1395ww (2012). Since 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have
refused payment for what have been referred to as "never events," which has continued under the
PPACA. See Medicaid Program; Payment Adjustment for Provider-Preventable Conditions Including
Health Care-Acquired Conditions, 76 Fed. Reg. 32816, 32817, 32821 (June 6, 2011) (to be codified at
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The AMA has also called for the reporting and examination of adverse
outcomes and medical mistakes. In December 2003, the AMA advised
physicians that it was their ethical responsibility to study and prevent error
and harm.131 Physicians, according to the opinion, should help establish
and then "participate fully" in effective, confidential, and protected error-
reporting mechanisms.132 Although all of these reporting requirements are
directed to reporting agencies that can then analyze the data and identify
corrective action, the AMA's opinion goes further and directs physicians to
talk with their patients and "offer a general explanation regarding the nature
of the error and the measures begin taken to prevent similar occurrences in
the future." '133 The opinion does not explain what a "general explanation"
means, but it does acknowledge that the "communication is fundamental to
the trust that underlines the patient-physician relations, and may help reduce
the risk of liability." '134
Putting aside a physician's ethical duty to communicate what happened
and why, physicians would be well-advised to be honest with their patients,
because there is evidence that disclosure actually reduces the chances that
they will be sued or, if they are, that the suit will actually go to trial. 13 5
Contrary to the belief that admitting a mistake will lead to a lawsuit, studies
suggest that patients sue their physicians because their physicians failed to
admit their mistakes or apologize for them.136 In one study of families who
sued physicians over prenatal injuries, for example, almost one quarter of
42 C.F.R. pt. 434, 438, 447) (classifying wrong-patient and wrong-site surgery as "never events" that"should never happen" and that "are entirely preventable," and refusing to provide reimbursement for
such events and consequent corrective treatment).
'3' AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MED. ETHICS, OPINION 8.121-ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO STUDY AND
PREVENT ERROR AND HARM (2003), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources
/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion8121 .page.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
131 See Helnreich, note 22, at 574 (citing several studies that suggest that apologies prevent lawsuits and
increase settlements of those that are filed); see also Pavlick, supra note 1, at 862 ("The practice of nev-
er apologizing is not in the public interest because it leads to litigation rather than reconciliation.")
(quoting Peter Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL.
115, 119 (1996)); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135,
1148 (2000) (quoting Marshall H. Tanick & Teresa J. Ayling, Alternative Dispute Resolution by Apolo-
gy: Settlement by Saying "I'm Sorry, " HENNEPIN LAW., July-Aug. 1996, at 23 (noting that an apology"can be an important element that lubricates settlement discussion.")).
36 See Boothman, et al., supra note 13, at 133 (citing one study suggesting that patients hire lawyers
when they have not received "adequate answers to questions about their outcomes, when they sense the
absence of accountability for what happened to them, and when they worry the same mistake could be
made in another patient's care"); Helmreich, supra note 22, at 574, n.35 (citing a British study suggest-
ing that patients who sued would not have if their physicians had apologized and explained what hap-
pened); Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1421, n.43 (citing a number of studies suggesting that pa-
tients who sued did so because of their physicians' lack of disclosure).
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the families who sued indicated that they sued only when they realized that
their physicians had not been "completely honest with them about what
happened, allowed them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally
misled them." '13
While there are certainly examples where an apology gives an injured
patient ammunition to use against his physician,138 there is compelling evi-
dence from two major hospital systems that being open and honest with pa-
tients after mistakes are made has a direct impact on the number of lawsuits
filed and the time it takes to settle the ones that are, calling into question the
need for the special protection afforded by each state's apology law.139
The first example comes from a pioneering program instituted at Chil-
dren's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota ("Children's").140 Even before
the publication of the IOM's report highlighting the frequency of patient
deaths due to medical mistakes, Children's required their physicians to dis-
close errors to patients and their families.141 Revolutionary at the time
when it was instituted in 1999, the program required the physicians in their
health care system to disclose to the families of their patients whenever
"anything significant" happened in connection with their child's care. 14 2
The physicians were also instructed to explain what they would do in the
future to prevent a similar event to occur in the future.143 According to the
Chair of the Ethics Committee at Children's, "[f]amilies appreciate this
openness. '"i" Indeed, as a direct result of the newly instituted procedures,
the number of lawsuits brought against the hospital system was reduced by
half.145
"' Cohen, supra note 49, at 1011 (citation omitted).
138 See, e.g., Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1270 (Colo. 2005) (discussing that after a physician told
the patient's son that he was "sorry about [his] father's situation and that things might have turned out
better had [the doctor] been at a major hospital and 'more up to date' on current treatment options," the
patient increased his settlement demand).
' Boothman, et al., supra note 13, at 137-44 (discussing the results of a study by the University of
Michigan Health System which found that honest disclosure reduces the instance of malpractice suits by
more than 200%); Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1435-36 (citing CHILDREN'S HosP.'s & CLINICS
OF MINN., WHAT WEVE LEARNED: STORIES AND MILESTONES FROM THE PATIENT SAFETY JOURNEY 4
(2006), available at http://www.childresmn.org/web/aboutus/072550.pdf (requiring disclosure whenever
something had happened that either caused harm or will potentially cause harm to their child)).
140 Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1435-36.
141 Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1435-36
142 Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1435-36.
14' Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1436.
" Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1436 (citation omitted).
145 Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1436.
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A similar program was instituted by the University of Michigan Health
System ("UIHS"), with similar results.'4 6 Under UMHS's system, and
Michigan law, a prospective plaintiff is required to file notice of his or her
intent to bring a medical malpractice claim six months before filing suit.14
This notice must contain the specifics about the claim, including the facts
supporting the claim and the standard of care that was breached." 8 This al-
lows the would-be defendants the opportunity to investigate the claim." 9
UMHS went beyond what the law required, however, and set up reporting
procedures and review within the hospital system, made changes based on
those reviews to improve patient care, met with patients, their families, and
their lawyers to discuss what happened and what was being done to correct
the problem if one was found, and promptly paid for injuries caused by
conduct that deviated from the proper standard of care. 15  Central to
UMHS's approach to handling claims was its "open and honest" communi-
cations with the patient and the patient's lawyer once it received notice of
the claim. 151 These communications allowed for review of what happened
and possible ways to resolve any claim the patient intended to bring, which
might include dropping the claim or settling it before suit was actually
filed. 152 Similar to what Children's experienced in Minnesota, UMHS saw
lawsuits against it fall by about half and suits that had been filed were set-
tled more quickly. 153
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the powerful empirical data suggesting that physicians can re-
duce their chances of being sued by communicating openly and honestly
with their patients, together with the well-established ethical duty of full
disclosure, the conclusion seems inescapable that physicians must disclose
mistakes and admit responsibility for those mistakes. As proven by the case
146 See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 137-46 (reviewing in detail the UMHS program).
'4 See Boothman, et al., supra note 13, at 137.
148See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 137-138 (citing MICH. COMp. LAWS. § 600.2912b (1994)).
141 See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 138.
150 See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 139. Although determining what does or does not meet the
proper standard of care may be open to debate, UMHS's Risk Management Department hired experi-
enced nurses who understood the medical issues raised by each claim to ensure a fair assessment. See
Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 139. UMHS also formed committees that would review the Risk
Management Department's decision on whether reasonable care had been taken. See Boothman et al.,
supra note 13, at 140.
'.' See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 142.
152 See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 142.
... See Boothman et al., supra note 13, at 143-44.
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law, admitting statements of regret and even fault do not make the loss of a
medical malpractice case a foregone conclusion.
State apology laws are not necessary to encourage health care providers
to do what they otherwise required to do. 154 If a physician's statements
help a patient forgive the physician, then the patient and the physician both
benefit and a lawsuit may never be brought. If those statements help a
plaintiff state a claim, then the physician should accept that responsibility.
It is, after all, exactly what we expect from children and we should expect
no less from health care providers who, at times, holds our lives in their
hands.
154 Jesson & Knapp, supra note 15, at 1411 ("it is a mistake to attempt to use evidentiary standards to
improve physician -patient communication").
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